Sexuality and intimacy are universal needs that transcend age, cognitive decline, and disability; sexuality is a fundamental aspect of the human experience. However, supporting sexuality in long-term residential care presents ethical challenges as this setting is both a home environment for residents and a workplace for health practitioners. This is particularly complex in the case of residents with dementia given the need to balance protection from harm and freedom of self-determination. Despite such complexity, this challenge has received limited critical theoretical attention. The dominant approach advocated to guide ethical reasoning is the bioethical four principles approach. However, the application of this approach in the context of dementia and long-term care may set the bar for practitioners' interference excessively high, restricting assentual (i.e., voluntary) sexual expression. Furthermore, it privileges cognitive and impartial decision-making, while disregarding performative, embodied, and relational aspects of ethical reasoning. With an interest in addressing these limitations, we explicate an alternative ethic of embodied relational sexuality that is grounded in a model of citizenship that recognizes relationality and the agential status of embodied self-expression. This alternative ethic broadens ethical reasoning from the exclusive duty to protect individuals from harm associated with sexual expression, to the duty to also uphold and support their rights to experience the benefits of sexual expression (e.g., pleasure, intimacy). As such it has the potential to inform the development of policies, organizational guidelines, and professional curricula to support the sexuality of persons with dementia, and thereby ensure more humane practices in long-term residential care settings.
Residents' sexual activity in not encouraged in long-term residential care settings (Miles & Parker, 1999; Parker, 2007) . For example, health practitioners commonly hold the perception that residents' sexuality is a complicated issue that is best avoided (Gilmer, Meyer, Davidson, & KoziolMcLain, 2010) . Their negative and patronizing attitudes toward residents' sexuality have also been documented in the literature (Parker, 2007; Roach, 2004) . Research has additionally found that when faced with residents' overt sexual expression, practitioners often feel unsure as to what to do, but feel the need to intervene nonetheless (Roach, 2004; Shuttleworth, Russell, Weerakoon, & Dune, 2010) . Such interventions can be threatening and punishing, such as denying residents their privacy, and physically restraining or separating them (Casta-Kaufteil, 2003; Hill, 2014) . There is also a concerning absence of attention to the sexuality of residents in current policy, professional training, and clinical guidelines (Everett, 2007) . Although there are some individual long-term care homes or local authorities that have developed their own guidelines regarding resident sexuality, these developments are few in number (Hill, 2014) and have not led to any systematic legislative or professional implementation. This lack of systematic implementation is likely because accreditation standards for long-term residential care do not require such polices (Cornelison & Doll, 2013) .
There is a pressing need to develop guidelines for ethical reasoning and residents' sexual expression in long-term care. Sexual expression and affection are universal needs that transcend age, cognitive decline, and disability (CastaKaufteil, 2003; Miles & Parker, 1999; Ni Lochlainn & Kenny, 2013) . Sexuality also has beneficial effects for older people, such as pleasure and intimacy, decreased pain sensitivity, increased relaxation, and lower levels of depression (Ni Lochlainn & Kenny, 2013; Syme, 2014) . This makes the suppression of residents' sexuality in long-term care settings particularly egregious. Following Jennings (2009) , "the goal of long-term care should be the preservation and restoration of capacities for human communicative relations and to honor the identity of the person with dementia" (p. 428). Having a sexual life contributes to achieving these goals, and thus guidelines are needed to ensure that institutions can provide the appropriate and necessary support for residents' "healing, wholeness, and human flourishing even in the labyrinth of dementia" (Jennings, 2009, p. 430) .
Nonetheless, there is a complex array of ethical, legal, personal, and professional considerations involved in the development of such ethical guidelines. Not only is there the need to balance residents' rights to sexual expression with their protection from undue risk, particularly with regard to sexual harm, but we must also consider the rights of health practitioners for whom facilitation of residents' sexual expression may constitute a moral compromise and/ or a compromise of their own sexual rights (Archibald, 2003; Roach, 2004) . The four moral principles approach of biomedical ethics (e.g., autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice) is most commonly referenced as the guide for ethical reasoning in the context of sexuality and long-term care (Kamel & Hajjar, 2004; Mahieu & Gastmans, 2012 ). Yet, the ethical complexity of this defies biomedical and reductionist attempts to address this matter, and thus there is a pressing need to consider scholarship on ethics from other disciplines. In particular, there have been important critiques raised from outside of gerontology about bioethics, the four principles approach, and their applicability in the context long-term care (Holm, 2001; Kuczewski, 1999) . These have prompted the development of alternative ethical frameworks that, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Mahieu, Anckaert, & Gastmans, 2014a) , have yet to be explored in the context of dementia and sexuality. As a step toward providing an alternative to the bioethical framework that can better support the sexuality of residents' with dementia in long-term care, we critically review feminist, anthropological, and legal scholarship. We draw on the strengths of these insights, identify limitations of proposed alternatives, and highlight the need for an ethic of sexuality that recognizes relationality, and the agential status of embodied self-expression (Kontos, Miller, & Kontos, in press; . We explicate just such an ethic, one that is grounded in a model of relational citizenship, and that integrates insights from philosophy, sociology, and citizenship studies. It is an interdisciplinary assemblage that offers an important alternative to bioethical principles and their positivist legacy, and thereby makes a critical contribution to the emerging field of ethics and dementia.
The Biomedical Approach to Ethical Reasoning
Ethics scholars committed to developing guidelines for ethical reasoning on sexuality in the context of long-term residential care typically turn to bioethics and the four moral principles approach (Kamel & Hajjar, 2004; Mahieu & Gastmans, 2012) . This approach has been developed to guide the decision-making of health practitioners in the context of providing patient care in acute care settings (Kuczewski, 1999) . The four principles approach (from here referred to as "the principles approach") defines appropriate ethical conduct for health practitioners with reference to four core principles: respect for individual autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009 ). According to this ethical approach, each of these principles represents a health practitioner's moral duty that should, in both theory and practice, be weighed against the other three duties when resolving ethical dilemmas. In particular, the goal of using these principles is "to achieve a balance between respecting the patient's autonomy and the physician's responsibility for the well-being of the patient" (Kuczewski, 1999, p. 15) .
The principle of respect for autonomy is founded upon the aspirational ideal of the autonomous agent who acts in accordance with a freely self-chosen and self-informed plan. In the context of sexuality, respect for autonomy is typically referred to as the support of individuals' right to self-determination and their right to privacy (Mahieu & Gastmans, 2012) . The principle of beneficence refers to the obligation to do and promote good. Non-maleficence refers to the obligation to protect individuals from evil or unreasonable harms. Within the context of sexuality, the principle of non-maleficence requires that individuals be protected from the risk of experiencing harms that are associated with the sexual expression concerned. Finally, the principle of justice refers to the responsibility to ensure that persons receive equal treatment and the obligation to prevent violence and discrimination (Mahieu & Gastmans, 2012) . In relation to sexuality, justice also concerns the obligation to weigh the justification for any interventions that are applied to restrict sexuality. These principles support the permissibility of intervening with the residents' sexuality if it is thought to result in the harm to their self, or harm or offense to others. However, these principles do not offer explicit guidance as to what constitutes the boundaries of acceptable harm and have been challenged in the context of their application to dementia and long-term care (Holm, 2001; Kuczewski, 1999) .
The appeal of using the principles approach is that it reduces the complexity of ethical reasoning to four concise principles that can then be used to produce documentation that offers tangible "evidence" that an ethical approach was applied to decision-making (e.g., consent forms, capacity assessments). There is further appeal to this approach given the prevalence of the "audit culture" (e.g., supports continuous quality improvements through the measurement and evaluation of quantitative metrics) that is fundamental to the regulatory structure of health care and health care research (Wilson, 2012) . Finally, the claim to the universalism of these four principles is appealing given the bureaucratization of health care and the corresponding interest in the standardization and harmonization of ethical conduct across care settings and geographical contexts (Petryna, 2005) .
Critiques of Bioethics
Feminist scholars have challenged the deductivist, or top down reasoning that bioethics privileges with its emphasis on "fixed and normative standards of judgement," arguing that ethical reasoning cannot be reduced to a set of abstract and universal rules (Hamington, 2015; Held, 2005; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000) . They have also suggested that bioethics does not sufficiently attend to context and to issues of power or consider how individual experiences and circumstances influence both practitioners' and patients' decision-making and choices (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Sherwin, 1998) . They claim that decontextualizing ethical reasoning is problematic as "it is only when a situation is appreciated in its particulars that the full moral problem and plausible tools for its resolution [can] appear" (Wolf, 1996, p. 15) . Finally, scholars have also suggested that bioethical approaches privilege "qualities of mind [such] as rationality, self-sovereignty, and impartiality" (Shildrick, 2005, p. 3), while neglecting to consider how the performative, embodied, and relational nature of care provision supports ethical reasoning (Hamington, 2015; Held, 2005) .
There have also been critiques of the applicability of bioethics and the principles approach for guiding ethical reasoning in the context of long-term residential care (Carter Wheelan, 2002; Kuczewski, 1999) . For example, scholars have argued that the principles approach is insufficient to guide decision-making in the context of long-term care, as these principles privilege one particular type of relationship, that of the doctor-patient, and work best when they are applied to an "event model of informed consent" in the context of a discrete interaction in an acute care setting (e.g., the disclosure of information to facilitate treatment choice). Thus, both the diversity of practitioner roles in residential care settings and the long-term nature of the care require the development of alternative ethical principles (Kuczewski, 1999) .
Scholars have also questioned whether the application of bioethical principles to sexuality is even possible in the context of long-term care. For example, they have pointed out that the physical environment of the long-term care home (e.g., open concept design) precludes the support of autonomy-related rights in relation to privacy (Parker, 2007) . They have also noted that information about residents' sexuality is routinely shared with their spouses and children, without staff considering this to be a violation of resident's right to privacy (Bauer, 1999) . Finally, few longterm care homes have policies that protect residents' rights to sexual privacy (Cornelison & Doll, 2013; Hill, 2014) . For example, few homes explicitly permit residents to display and use sexually themed materials in their private rooms, or have policies that support sexual privacy, such as the allocation of private spaces for sexual activity, or the use of privacy curtains in shared rooms (Hill, 2014) .
Finally, the application of these principles to decisionmaking with respect to supporting persons living with dementia has also been problematized. For example, scholars have argued that the application of the principle of autonomy reflects that this principle is premised on an "all or nothing global competence" (Mahieu & Gastmans, 2012, p. 349) . Given that dementia is characterized by the progressive deterioration of cognition, which affects reasoning capacity, persons with dementia may fail to measure up to the ideal of the autonomous agent (Kamel & Hajjar, 2004) . The demand for an "all or nothing global competence" further suggests that competence, as an ethical category, is a feature accorded to certain kinds of persons, rather than certain kinds of decisions (Holm, 2001) . Consequently, such an ethical criterion automatically disqualifies all decisions made by persons with dementia as incompetent, rather than seeing decisional competence as spread along a wide continuum. Bioethical principles can thus give rise to an absolutization of rationality and cognition, both of which are impaired with dementia. As a consequence, this sets the bar for undue interference when there is dementia significantly high, with the application of this principle erring on the side of the duty to intervene, over freedom of self-expression (Everett, 2007; Holm, 2001) .
Promising Alternatives to Bioethics
There have been two critical alternatives to bioethics proposed for guiding ethical decision-making in the context of sexuality and dementia. The first of these is the anthropological-ethical framework presented by Mahieu and colleagues (Mahieu et al., 2014a; Mahieu, Anckaert, & Gastmans, 2014b) . These scholars cite the impetus for this alternative framework as the desire to redress the problematic focus on establishing cognitive capacity as the criterion for the moral permissibility of sexual behavior in the context of dementia. Arguing that this focus reflects hypercognitivism (Post, 1995) , and that sexuality is not of the order of cognitive understanding, Mahieu and colleagues (2014a) suggest that their anthropological model offers a more inclusive and supportive foundation for clinical ethical decision-making. The model is based on four tenets: the decentered self, human embodiment, being-in-theworld, and being-with-others. In combination, these tenets offer a reconceptualization of what it means to be "truly independent" by capturing the elusiveness of human existence, the tension between meaning and disorientation, and continuity and discontinuity. When applied to dementia, sexuality is thus considered neither a medical nor behavioral manifestation of impaired cognitive capacity, but rather "a lived expression of being a decentered and embodied being-in-the-world with others" (Mahieu et al., 2014a, p. 386 ). This offers a promising alternative ontology for ethical decision-making that grants primacy to a pre-reflective notion of agency, symbolic mediations of the self, and intersubjectivity. However, in the absence of providing an articulation of how the tenets themselves are interrelated, and the ways in which their interrelationship is intended to guide ethical reflection, the model does precisely what the authors caution against, which is a "lapsing into the vagueness of anthropological implicitness" (Mahieu et al., 2014a, p. 386) . This consequently leaves unaddressed how pre-reflective agency is implicated in both individual and shared sexual expression, and how this should be considered when supporting the sexuality of persons living with dementia.
Legal scholars have similarly taken issue with the exclusive focus of bioethics on establishing cognitive capacity for sexuality. As an example, the "Cognition +" test (BoniSaenz, 2015) is an approach that regards individual sexual capability as a function of both a person's cognitive abilities and the "social resources and the legal treatment of those abilities and resources" (Boni-Saenz, 2015, p. 5). The dual focus on mental capacities and social capital effectively locates decision-making capacity in both the autonomous individual and their social support network, what feminist ethics scholars have termed the "relational autonomy" approach (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Sherwin, 1998) . Contra the liberal ideal of individual autonomy, this approach deems that decisional capacity is dynamic in nature, changing with the meaning and structures of people's relationships and the circumstances in which they find themselves (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Sherwin, 1998) . The significance of the "Cognition +" test is that it begins with establishing volition, rather than consent, then moves to assessing capacity for decision-making in relation to the context in which sexuality is expressed, and assessing the competence of the individuals' social support network. This approach importantly highlights the shared nature of sexual decision-making. However, in treating cognitive capacity as a necessary criterion for determining the need for intervention, it may reduce relational autonomy to the paternalism of bioethical and medicolegal approaches (Sherwin, 1998) , thus undermining this as a viable alternative. In particular, without consideration of embodied intentionality, which in the context of severe and persisting cognitive impairment is the primary means of engagement, decision-making under the "Cognition +" approach falls short of being truly relational.
The Embodied Relational Ethic of Sexuality
To redress the limitations of bioethics, and the alternatives to bioethics that have been proposed to guide ethical decision-making in the context of sexuality and dementia, we explicate an embodied and relational ethic of sexuality (Kontos, Grigorovich, Kontos, & Miller, 2016) . This ethic is grounded in a relational model of citizenship that reflects the importance of supporting the capacities, senses, and sociocultural dispositions of the body that are central to self-expression, interdependence, and the relational nature of engagement (Kontos, 2006; Kontos et al., in press ). Linking ethical reflection to the relational model of citizenship represents an ontological and epistemological shift from bioethics, as it integrates embodiment and relationality into an ethical sensibility (Sevenhuijsen, 2003; Worsfold, 2000) . This sensibility is marked by openness and responsiveness to persons with dementia, and an imperative to invest in institutional policies, structures, and practices that ensure that persons with dementia are actively included in "the human moral community" (Jennings, 2009) .
The model of relational citizenship builds on relationship-centered approaches to dementia care (Nolan, Ryan, Enderby, & Reid, 2002 ) that aim to redress the lack of inclusion of persons with dementia as active partners in their own care and that focus on the development and maintenance of relationships between persons living with dementia, family carers, and health practitioners. However, these approaches have not benefited from the insights of critical gerontology's subfield of embodiment and dementia, where primordial and sociocultural dispositions of the body are recognized as agential sources of self-expression-what has been termed "embodied selfhood" (Kontos, 2004 (Kontos, , 2006 . Embodied selfhood captures the pre-reflective capacity of the body to seize upon and transform the perceptible into something meaningful. It thereby challenges the assumptions of loss of agency with dementia by treating the body as itself having both creative and intentional capacity. Thus, even in the face of severe and persistent cognitive impairment, agency still persists. In incorporating a pre-reflective notion of agency into a relational approach to care, this primary agential source of interactive and communicative practices is foundational to how persons living with dementia can be active partners in their own care Kontos et al., in press ). The recognition of the significance of embodied selfhood for relationality, reciprocity, and interdependence thus offers a critical foundation for guiding ethical decision-making in the context of dementia and sexuality.
The embodied and relational ethic of sexuality upholds sexuality as fundamental to embodied self-expression. Further, sexual expression is valued for its own sake, rather than for instrumental purposes (e.g., reproduction) and is recognized as a universal human need (Lottes, 2013) . Upholding these rights is critical in the context of persons with dementia due to the biomedicalization of sexuality in dementia, whereby the sexual expression of persons with dementia is often conceptualized as a problem to be managed and treated with some form of restraint such as pharmacological or mechanical intervention (Cipriani, Ulivi, Danti, Lucetti, & Nuti, 2016) . For example, the emergence of the pre-diagnostic category of "inappropriate sexual behavior" exemplifies how sexual expression in dementia is pathologized and constructed as a paraphilia that needs biomedical intervention (Cipriani et al., 2016; Tucker, 2010) .
Grounding an ethic of sexuality in the relational model of citizenship Kontos et al., in press; importantly broadens the exclusive goal of ethical decision-making from the duty only to protect individuals from harm, to the duty also to uphold and support their sexual rights in long-term care settings. Supporting sexual rights in this context involves more than upholding negative rights to sexuality by removing environmental and legislative barriers that restrict individual or shared sexual expression (Appel, 2010) . It additionally necessitates the duty to facilitate realization of sexual rights through the mobilization of sociocultural and political structures that nurture and facilitate individuals' opportunities for sexual expression (Appel, 2010; Shildrick, 2007) . Upholding positive rights to sexuality would thus include developing public health, professional training, and policy initiatives to raise awareness and to counteract stigma that surrounds aged sexuality and dementia, and that fosters discriminatory and marginalizing health practitioner attitudes and care practices (Cornelison & Doll, 2013; Roach, 2004) . Further, it would require the identification and correction of oppressive organizational practices in long-term residential care settings (e.g., prohibition against use of sexual materials, and staff not knocking before entering residents' private rooms). Such educational initiatives and organizational changes would need to be sensitive to the complexity of balancing the rights of individual residents with those of other residents, as well as the rights of health practitioners.
Finally, adoption of this ethic also requires the development and provision of diverse leisure and social activities for long-term care residents that are supportive of sexual expression and the formation of intimate relationships. For example, providing assistance for residents "along the continuum of facilitated sex" that could include practitioners assisting residents with the procurement of sexual materials, or by providing assistance with undressing, getting into bed or body positioning to facilitate sexual expression (Earle, 2001) . Scholars have also argued that supporting sexual expression in long-term care must include the facilitation of both autonomous (e.g., masturbation) and shared (e.g., with another person) sexual expressions (Appel, 2010; Thomsen, 2015) . It is suggested that the latter could be sustained by allowing residents to access professional sexual surrogacy services (e.g., trained sexual therapists who provide sexual advice and are also allowed to do "limited touching" of clients), even in jurisdictions where commercial sex work is legally prohibited (Appel, 2010; Kulick & Rydstrom, 2015) . These types of services are already provided to persons with disabilities living in Denmark and Switzerland (Appel, 2010; Kulick & Rydstrom, 2015) .
Conclusions
Scholars who have critiqued bioethics and the principles approach are divided between those who seek to "improve" bioethics and those who maintain that it needs to be "radically reconstituted" to overcome its epistemological and ontological limitations for addressing pressing normative questions (Hamington, 2015; Petersen, 2013; Shildrick, 2005) . Consistent with the latter approach, our contention is that, given the nature of limitations of bioethical principles, there is the need to furnish ethical decision-making with a new ontological and epistemological foundation that integrates insights from diverse disciplinary approaches and plural knowledges. Such "cross-fertilization of borrowing" (Klein, 1996) is a vital stimulus for challenging the instrumentalism of mainstream bioethics and for rendering taken for granted categories and claims to universalism vulnerable to displacement and deconstruction. This is particularly pressing in the context of dementia and sexuality given how the ontological premises of bioethics and the principles approach effectively impoverish embodied agency, and thereby vitiate their moral potential to guide ethical decision-making in this area. The alternative ethic of embodied relational sexuality recognizes and supports primordial and sociocultural dispositions of the body as being central to selfhood and relationality. Additionally, the relational citizenship framework, within which this ethic is grounded, importantly confers certain rights and correlative public obligations to support sexual expression for persons with dementia as a mode of relationality, specifically mutuality, interdependence, social justice, and self-determination.
An embodied and relational ethic of sexuality sets a new transdisciplinary standard for ethical reflection regarding the preservation of the agency of persons with dementia living in long-term residential care. It is a standard that we hope will be embraced by gerontologists, policy makers, managers, and health practitioners who are equally committed to ensuring that persons with dementia are entitled to equal opportunities to participate in sexual activities and relations to the fullest extent possible.
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